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How to Accelerate Economic Growth in the 
Euroarea? 
Dimitar Chobanov 
 
The impetus for this article is a Budget and 
Finance Committee with the Bulgarian 
Parliament inquiry to the IME on the question 
“How to accelerate economic growth in the 
Euroarea?” because of participation of Bulgarian 
deputies in an interparliamentary discussion. 
The scope of the answer is broader as the 
proposals are relevant not only for the Euroarea 
(EA) but also for the European Union (EU) as a 
whole. For that purpose a short SWOT analysis 
is made without the claim to be comprehensive. 
Strengths of EA and EU economies are the 
relatively good quality of education and 
healthcare, the availability of trained human 
resources, the well-developed infrastructure; and 
the relatively low energy intensity (188 kg of oil 
equivalent per 1000 euro produced GDP for the 
EA, in comparison to the United States – 314 kg, 
but not to Japan 119 kg).1 
Weaknesses are the multitudes of regulations, 
the great size of the public sector, and the 
relatively lower R&D expenditures (1.9 percent 
of GDP for the EA compared to 2.6 percent in 
the United States and 3.15 percent of GDP in 
                                                 
1 Eurostat data. 
Japan). At the same time “Europe” works about 
35% less than USA and 40% less than “Japan” 
(according to Olivier Blanchard’s study). 
According to the OECD/SIGMA measurements 
in 2001 the burden of the EU legislation on 
companies in the member states is about EUR 
540 billion per year.2 (There are not such 
comprehensive measurements after 2001 but the 
different assessments of the Lisbon Strategy 
admit that the situation is even worse.) 
Opportunities for the EU and the EA are 
discovered, at present, mainly by joining of new 
members from “New Europe” and by 
strengthening the relations to Mediterranean and 
other neighbor countries. 
Threats to the economy may arise due to 
worsening demography; the growing gap in 
incomes per head and the labor productivity with 
the United States; budget deficits (they are 2.7 
percent of GDP in 2004), the growing 
government debt, as well as unfavorable 
development in the international conjuncture. 
The following initiatives related to the 
macroeconomic evaluation aimed at accelerating 
the growth rate of the European Union and the 
Euroarea economies are proposed: 
                                                 
2 See SIGMA (OECD), Improving policy instruments 
through impact assessment, Sigma paper No. 31, 17 
May 2001, p. 40.  This is about 3-4% of EU’s GDP.  
This burden is 2.5 times bigger in Bulgaria. 
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• The EU should be transformed into a 
free trade area and the restrictions (tariff 
and non-tariff) on the trade with non-EU 
countries should be removed, combined 
with a full rejection of the competition 
policy, based on concepts like “social” 
dumping. Since Adam Smith, the freedom 
of exchange is acknowledged as one of the 
main sources of economic growth. The 
removal of the obstacles to free trade 
would increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of European economies by 
directing resources to the most productive 
use. 
• Limiting the European Central Bank’s 
functions by enabling a free competition of 
currencies in EU borders including those 
issued by private institutions (banks and 
large corporations); facilitating the 
adoption of the euro as a legal tender in 
countries willing to use this currency. 
Sound money is a substantial element for 
the economic growth because it does not 
allow income redistribution, which is not 
justified by the market competition; they 
also reduce the uncertainty about the 
future prices and costs for planning. 
• Refusal of so-called “welfare state”; 
reforms in pension and healthcare system 
to increase the share of capital pillar and 
the saving rate. Systems based on 
solidarity should be reduced to provide the 
minimum of a certain service while the 
main package should be secured by 
individual accounts in separate capital 
funds. Pension system deficits become 
very important in the case of worsening 
demographic indicators and require faster 
actions in this direction. 
• Reforming education as it should 
provide human resources and be 
instrumental in the so-called “knowledge-
based economy”. Separating this system 
from the state, using vouchers and 
decentralization will provide funding for 
these educational institutions, which are 
preferred by the market and will increase 
the quality. This, of course, is applied in 
some countries but the good cases should 
be more. 
• Private provision of so-called public 
services and privatization not only of state-
owned enterprises which are relatively 
large in number but also of the other 
existing assets of the state (infrastructure, 
land, forests and mountains, rivers, water, 
seaside, underground resources, etc.). 
According to a Deutsche Bank study from 
September 2004, investment and projects 
in this area should amount of EUR 15 
trillion by 2015. New member states will 
gain more by this privatization. This is 
particularly applicable to Bulgaria where 
there are greater limitations, the 
information is less and the de facto 
protection of local privileged persons from 
foreign investment has continued longer. 
• Lowering the tax burden, stimulating 
the tax competition among the single 
member states because the tax rate 
harmonization is harmful for countries 
willing to develop faster. The situation in 
new member states implementing policies 
of lower and flatter taxes on income and 
profit indicates that they achieve faster 
economic growth and attract more 
investment. Moreover, budget deficits 
should also be decreased thus reducing the 
possibility for higher debt burden for the 
next generations. 
• Reforming the common agriculture 
policy through removal of subsidies for 
this particular industry as well as others; 
limiting the government interference in 
agriculture production market (removal of 
so-called intervention agencies). Common 
agriculture policy is a substantial element 
of the EU budget and works as a 
redistribution mechanism of income to a 
particular industry on account of the rest. 
Free trade and competition as well as the 
lack of subsidies and market interventions 
would decrease the prices and force 
farmers to produce more efficiently. 
• Liberalizing labor market, labor 
migration and working time, reducing the 
regulations related to hiring and firing 
workers; reforming the social safety net 
(reducing the size and duration of aids) 
and facilitating free movement of people 
and services. This measure is aimed to 
decreasing the unemployment ratio in EU, 
which has grown during the last years. 
Flexible labor market enables creation of 
new jobs and higher income and gives 
incentives to people to work instead of rely 
on social payments. 
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Presented measures are directed to the expansion 
of the economic freedom in the European 
countries, which in turn is highly correlated with 
achieving higher rate of long-term economic 
growth. These actions should be an object of 
further description and extension but they 
comprise the main path that should be followed 
by the EU. A great number of them may and 
must be applied in Bulgaria where the expected 
results would be even larger because of the 
greater need for reforms in the country. 
 
 
 
The Liberalization of the EU Labor Market – 
a Myth or a Reality? 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht3 that established the 
European Union (EU) divided all EU policies, 
which had to be carried out into three main 
areas, called pillars. 
• The first or “Community” pillar 
concerns economic, social and 
environmental policies 
• The second or “Community Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP)” pillar concerns 
foreign policy and military matters 
• The third or “Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters” (PJCC) 
unites the efforts in establishing co-
operation in the fight against crime. This 
pillar was originally named “Justice and 
Home Affairs” 
One of the main elements that constitute the first 
pillar is the institution of a single market, also 
called a common market. In fact, out of 16 
policy fields, setting up the Community pillar, 
the single market vision is put on the first place 
and this not by a mere accident. Having all 
factors of production (goods, services, capital 
and labor) move freely in a certain area 
represents the fourth stage of an economic 
integration4, which completion in the EU-zone 
has actually been the central objective for almost 
                                                 
3 Formally, The Treaty on European Union was 
signed on 7 February 1992 in Maasrticht between the 
members of the European Community and entered 
into force on 1 November 1993, under the Delors 
Commission. 
4 The degree of economic integration is usually 
categorized into six stages: Preferential trading area – 
Free trade area – Customs Union – Common market 
– Economic and Monetary Union – Complete 
Economic Integration  
half a century. Thus, there has always been a 
bright recognition that market allocation of 
resources is not a bad thing, but a desirable aim.  
But is it just a paper wish that looks into the 
distant future or it will be soon a reality?  
“Unfortunately”, in order to achieve complete 
economic integration, and therefore to enjoy all 
the positive implications on economic growth, 
employment and finally the standard of living, 
there is no way around the liberalization of all 
the national markets, be they for goods, services, 
labor force or financial instruments. That means 
not only removing physical barriers (borders) 
and producing common technical standards 
(which has already been done), it is much more 
at skipping national regulations which shelter 
whole industries and markets. Once the 
competition is blocked there is no way for 
resources to find their most proper place on a 
natural basis (impossible to achieve that 
artificially – command economies) and thus to 
perform best. Since the allocation of production 
factors is not effective, occurring costs are at a 
higher level, and so are the prices.  
Liberalization of markets has a perfect 
mathematical and economical justification 
however since decisions are taken by politicians 
and open markets are not a beloved pre-election 
instrument that does not mean much, it is always 
at the people’s expenses.  
Within the European Union the free movement 
of the three main production factors – goods, 
services and capital – is by largely secured 
(except for import / export quotas on some 
products and the like), however the labor market 
in most of the old member states stands closed 
or hardly accessible as for workers coming from 
outside the union as for those coming from the 
new EU-countries.  
Before the last enlargement that took place on 
May 1 2004, 12 out of 15 old members 
(exceptions: United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Sweden) introduced special agreements 
containing restrictions to labor force from the 
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new member states. Except for Spain and 
Finland, the rest (10 countries) stated they would 
keep these transitional arrangements until 2009, 
which means sheltering the labor market for 4 
more years. Blocking the natural allocation of 
the labor force resource is definitely not the right 
way to prosperity, but still can help counting 
more votes. 
A couple of weeks ago the European 
Commission (EC) adopted a report listing 
economic arguments against those restrictions, 
which is to be handed over to EU leaders at a 
March summit this year. According to the report 
“the migration flows following the enlargement 
have had positive effects on the economies of 
EU15 member states”. In reverse: any restriction 
of the labor force migration would limit the 
favorable impact on the economy or generally 
intensify the negative trends in labor market in 
the most of the old member states.  
The data in the following table undoubtedly 
supports the conclusions made by the EC 
experts: 
Table 1: Real GDP growth rate (at constant prices 
2000; percentage change on previous year)  
 2004 2005 
USA 4,2 % 3,5 % 
United Kingdom 3,2 % 1,8 % 
Ireland 4,5 % 4,4 % 
Sweden 3,7 % 2,5 % 
EU15 2,3 % 1,4 % 
Source: Eurostat**  
 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden are 
exactly those three countries, which did not 
introduce any transitional arrangements that 
would have shut out partially or entirely their 
national labor market. No wonder that their GDP 
growth rates are significantly higher than the 
EU15 average (in fact, the difference is even 
bigger because their rates pull up the average 
level)*. 
The figure for the USA is just a reference point. 
The annual real GDP growth rate in America 
would have never been twice and more than 
twice as high as the one in EU15 if for instance a 
teacher or a gardener from Texas gets a better 
job in California but still can not go there 
because the State of California is sheltering the 
labor market and does not allow workers from 
other states to enter.  
If that would have happened there, America 
would not be America and California would not 
be California. 
Why then is it possible in the European Union? 
--------- 
* That could not be the only reason but is still one of 
the most important ones. 
** See here. 
 
 
 
Health Insurance of Emigrants in Bulgaria or 
How the State Blackmails Its Citizens  
Adriana Mladenova 
 
At the beginning of 2005 tens of thousands of 
emigrants started a campaign against the 
mandatory health insurance system based on the 
principle of citizenship, which is legally set in 
Bulgaria and as such is a precedent for the rest 
of the world. The great scale of the action results 
from the large number of the emigrants, but 
despite the active position of those citizens who 
directly bear the consequences of the regulation 
and their prepositions for a justified amendment 
of the law and the analysis provided, there is no 
result until now. On the contrary, the 
amendments that have been made in the 
regulation framework of the health insurance 
system are unclear and leave a room for 
discretion, injustice and inefficiency. 
 
Retrospection of the events  
On the first March 2005 Paris News Edition 
initiated a subscription list against the 
mandatory health insurance payments for the 
Bulgarian emigrants. They wanted to change the 
law in such a way that the Bulgarians who live 
abroad not to be obliged to pay health insurance 
taxes in Bulgaria during the period of their 
living outside the country. 
In May 2005 there was an amendment of the 
Law on Mandatory Health Insurance, which 
allowed a small number of the emigrants to be 
relieved from the duty to pay health security 
taxes after 2005. However, these Bulgarians 
have to pay social security taxes in the country 
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they live in and they should also pay their 
accumulated obligation during the period 
between 2000 and 2005 in Bulgaria.  
In an open letter to the president of Bulgaria 
Georgi Parvanov published on 10 May 2005, 
Bulgarian emigrants wanted to reverse the law 
amendment. They cited two main problems:  
 First, according to the law, there is a 
provision for relieving future obligations 
only in case emigrants pay health 
security tax in the country they live. 
This means discrimination of the 
citizens which is against the 
Constitution. 
 
 Second, the cumbersome bureaucratic 
procedures and endless administrative 
rules. The declarations that should be 
sent to NOI (National Security Institute) 
cannot be downloaded from the Internet. 
The emigrants have to declare that they 
have not used the state health insurance 
system for the period they have lived 
aboard. 
Not even a single step forward has been made 
towards greater efficiency and better functioning 
of the system in order to facilitate the citizens. 
Once again it seems that the government heads 
are lead by the presumption that the main 
activity of the Bulgarian citizens, the emigrants 
in particular, is to follow closely the laws, to pay 
for services they have never used, to fight 
against all bureaucratic obstacles and lose their 
time meanwhile.  
A stress should be laid also on the fact that the 
law limits the ability of people to choose the set 
of rules under which to live. Once born in 
Bulgaria, a man is deprived of the opportunity 
not to pay mandatory social security even if he 
decides to live in a country where no such 
system exists. 
What is the result of the open letter and the 
campaign that has been supported by tens of 
thousand of signatures? The government not 
only has not changed the law, but made up new 
“incentives” for paying the security taxes. Every 
Bulgarian emigrant who has had the imprudence 
to choose a GP in Bulgaria and has not changed 
his citizenship has received a letter by NOI at 
the end of last year, for the sum he owes, 
together with the accumulated interest payments. 
The sums are different for each case, but for a 
period of 5 years, it is about 1000 leva. 
According to data by NOI, only 25 000 people 
or around 5% of emigrants have not chosen a GP 
and as such are not liable to pay social security 
taxes. 
If the Bulgarian emigrants do not pay their 
“obligation” or do not appeal against it, the state 
has the right to distrait their bank accounts and 
to confiscate their property. What is more, a 
discussion is widely spread in Bulgaria for the 
possibility of the state to be able to take away 
passports on the boundary of citizens who have 
not paid their security bills.  
 
Findings 
The major finding is that the state acts as an 
aggressor that uses coercion and does not 
observe even the basic human rights of 
movement and private property. The case does 
not even consider whether the emigrant has ever 
used or will use the health security service. At 
the same time, he has no right to reject it as the 
duty is imposed retrospectively on past periods. 
Surely, it may be the case that some percentage 
of the emigrants has used the state health 
security system without paying for it but this 
number cannot be estimated and even so, it 
cannot be a justification for the existing 
regulation. We are far away from the belief that 
even an effort is made for a cost-benefit analysis 
of the law on health security. Benefits for the 
state include accumulating of resources from 
“debtors”, while the costs are: (1) expenses for 
writing and sending the letters, (2) opportunity 
costs because a part of the emigrants may prefer 
to stay abroad or to minimize the period of their 
stay in the country for a danger of having their 
passports or even property taken away and thus, 
they will not spend the money they have saved 
abroad in Bulgaria.  
From a macroeconomic point of view, the 
emigrants are net lenders for the country and the 
item “Net Transfers from Abroad” has a positive 
balance and together with Foreign Investments 
accounts for much of the positive trends in the 
balance of payment. According to data from 
BNB (Bulgarian Central Bank), Bulgarians 
abroad have returned in the country about 616 
million Euro for the first 10 months of 2005. 
Having in mind the multiplication effect of the 
money, these resources are an important factor 
and a catalyst for the upsurge of the Bulgarian 
economy.   
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Besides the appeal for a change in the law and 
the particular paragraphs discussed so far, the 
general faults of the existing health system 
should be detected. Its main defect is that fact 
that it is ruled in a bureaucratic manner by state 
officials which inevitably leads to inefficiency 
and decision making based on personal and 
policy interests and intrigues rather than profit 
seeking.  
The mandatory health insurance is a collective 
fund that accumulates its assets by taking money 
away from the citizens in the form of social 
security taxes. This way of functioning of the 
system, without incentives and entrepreneurial 
approach in managing the fund, is doomed to 
failure. Blackmailing people as a means of 
collecting revenues for the state system is 
impermissible and is a direct result of the faulty 
design of the health insurance system. Payment 
for the health services should be made on the 
base of services used, not on the principle of 
citizenship.  
 
 
 
 
EU SME Programs: A Quick Overview 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
European Union 
Six years ago, in 2000 (at the meeting of the 
European Council in Fiera, near Milan) the EU 
leaders approved the European Charter for Small 
Enterprises. It calls the member states the 
Commission to support and encourage SME 
policies in ten key areas: 
1. Education and training for 
entrepreneurship,  
2. Cheaper and faster start-ups, 
3. Better legislation and regulation, 
4. Greater availability of skills, 
5. Improved on line access [to services and 
public registries/information], 
6. Improved benefit from the European 
single market, 
7. Taxation and financial support, 
8. Strengthening technological capacity, 
9. Access to successful e-business models 
and to top-class small business support, 
10. Stronger and more effective 
representation of SME interests at EU 
and national levels  
EU accession countries (in 2002, at a conference 
in Slovenia) and the countries of the Western 
Balkans (in 2003, in Thessalonica) endorsed the 
Charter. 
 
The Logic and Implementation 
In principle, the areas 1, 4, 6, 8 and 9 might be 
provided for on a contractual and market basis. 
Most of the faster growing EU member states 
follow this approach. But the charter explicitly 
requires that countries follow set of policies 
related to SME’s, and in this respect countries 
also differ from prevailing market to not-so-
prevailing market based policies. 
It is not quite clear what area 10 would mean on 
EU level, besides a SME Envoy, a set of 
directives and other not so binding regulations. 
On national level, as a rule, there is a 
government authority responsible to SME 
policy. 
Areas 2, 3, 5 and 7 are very different from 
country to country. 
Most of the countries have simplified business 
registries, some of them, like Germany in 2004, 
rather recently and some still have the 
registration with the courts. With exception of 
Hungary and Slovenia the business registration 
in all new member state and Romania is already 
an administrative procedure. Endorsement of the 
Charter did not lead simplified registration in 
none of the Balkan countries except Serbia and 
Montenegro but reforms are under way in 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and 
Macedonia. 
The regulation is a special case in point: 
according to some estimates, the cost to 
European forms of responding to EU and 
national administrative requirements amounts to 
540 billion euros per year (3-4 % of GDP).5 For 
many reasons but most due to the harmonization 
with the EU law, in new member states these 
                                                 
5 SIGMA (OECD), Improving policy instruments 
through impact assessment, Sigma paper No. 31, 17 
May 2001, p. 40. 
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costs are, perhaps, two times higher, as a share 
of GDP. (Specific research that corresponds to 
the OECD/SIMGA data is available for only few 
countries.) Some countries, like EU have 
adopted, like United Kingdom and to some 
extend Ireland, have endorse a practice of 
regular reviews of policies and regulations in 
pipeline and ex-post from the point of view of 
small enterprise. In some new member states, 
SME authorities or ministries of economy have 
such mandate. In not-yet member states, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey those 
authorities are rather mediators of EU programs 
than reviewers of policies on behalf of SME’s 
Taxation and financial support (area 7) are also 
very different. As a rule, taxes are low, close to 
Former Soviet Union nominal levels, in the new 
member state and much higher in the old 
Europe. In the new member states government 
expenditure are at the level of 35% of GDP, in 
older member state – at, roughly, 45% of GDP.  
 
Financing SME’s 
EU financial support (meaning EU funds per se, 
not those of the individual member states) for 
SME’s is difficult to identify. The problem is 
that it is dispersed in different programs and the 
issues require specific research. The program 
that is specifically designed to boost SME 
competitiveness is the so-called 6th Framework 
Program.  
It will spend EURO 2.338 billion in 2006-2013, 
they will be distributed on a competitive basis; 
EURO 473 million for SME research and 
development. Other subsidies, agriculture and 
regional will also benefit SME6. Financial 
guaranties are channeled through different 
investment arms of the European Investment 
Bank (European Investment Fund - EIF, Venture 
Capital and Portfolio Guarantees). In 2002, as 
stated in the 2003 EIF report to the European 
Parliament, the total SME portfolio amounted to 
EURO 7 billion. The EIF 2004 -2006 EIF 
Operational Plan this level of financing will be 
roughly sustained.7  
                                                 
6 In 2005, agriculture subsidies were EURO 49 
billion and will remain roughly unchanged in the nest 
three years; 2005 regional funds were EURO 32 
billion.  
7 For 2002 figures see: F.A.W Carpenter, European 
Parliament Hearing of the Budget Committee on the 
Financial Instruments for SMEs, European 
Parliament, 2003, p. 3; EIF Operational Plan is 
How effective is this financing? It is difficult to 
answer. Obviously, the funds available at far 
below the compliance costs to meet EU 
requirements. 
On the other hand, the funds available for 
member state and non-member states are 
impossible to identify without a specialized 
research. And I doubt whether even a focused 
effort would be able the exact amount of tax-
euros and the process of disbursement. In a 
contrast US taxpayers’ support for SME’s in the 
vicinity of EU is readily available on Internet, at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/
pdf/ The US President’s Small Business 
Administration website has the current fiscal 
year report on its front-page of Internet. This is 
not the case in most of the EU countries. 
 
Efficiency 
The strength of EU SME programs is that they 
presuppose a set of macro conditions in terms of 
fiscal, trade and macro economic policies to be 
followed as well standards in the area of the rule 
of law, property rights and access to justice and 
it has the sets of instruments to impose those 
preconditions on accession countries. When 
countries join the Union these instruments are 
non applicable, the enforcement tools are more 
of a diplomatic nature but may also include 
limiting the access to EU funds. 
Some of the weaknesses have been mentioned 
above. In terms of funding, it is rather difficult 
to obtain without cumbersome bureaucratic 
paperwork. The interviewed experts said that 
roughly 60% of the application time is filling 
forms, and only 40% is devoted to substance, to 
designing the project and services; under 
USAID and WB procurement rules the bulk of 
the time is spent on substance. This might be a 
subjective statement, but it is a dominant 
perception of everyone who has had experience 
with both types of donors. 
The process of the European Union Commission 
programs (e.g. PHARE, TACIS, CARDS – a 
program for the so called Western Balkans) to 
establish the level of preparedness of 
governments to follow proper macro policy 
objectives is more complicated: it depends on 
the status of the country vis-a-vie the Union, on 
the accumulated knowledge by the research 
directorate of the Commission, and on the ability 
                                                                         
available at: www.eif.org . 
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or the willingness of a government to fill a 
project fiche. In general, those programs and 
budget are scrutinized to a lesser extend than 
programs of individual donor countries, 
countries, belonging to programs/departments 
have never cooperated on concrete project basis, 
irrespectively the rationale and readiness of/for 
the cooperation. In terms of transparency, there 
is a room to desire more. Usually, there is a 
combined effect of two bureaucracies, on the 
member country and the EU. In December 2005, 
the EU Court of Auditors refused for an eleventh 
year in row to sign off the EU budget.* 
------------ 
* See comment in: Kevin P. Allen, Inaction in 
Action: the Court of Auditors, European 
Commissioners and the Problem of Financial 
Mismanagement, IME, Economic Policy Review, No 
34, October-December 2005, available at: 
www.ime.bg.org/pr_en/index.html . 
 
 
Where is Bulgaria Among Others in Terms of 
Providing Access to Its National Legislation 
on Internet Free of Charge? 
Veliko Dimitrov, Kevin Allen 
 
There is always a need to know what are you 
paying your taxes for. That means in the first 
place just to know how is your government (not 
only the Council of Ministers, but also the 
Parliament) is doing its job. Thus the 
government produces regulations and rules and 
to be able to properly assess the rulers, you have 
to know these rules, i.e. to have access to them: 
not using a mediator and/or paying a bunch of 
money (6 010 lv./year for the electronic version 
now, which is more than 15 average month 
salaries), but enjoying free access on the Internet 
to authentic and functional files. Is that really so 
hard? It must be since it has not been done yet. 
Let us look at some other countries: 
Probably not by accident Romania and Bulgaria 
still have not joined the EU. While it is a bit 
better in Romania you still need to subscribe and 
pay there to know what your rights and 
responsibilities are.  
 
Some better practices: 
All EU-member states publish their legislation 
and official announcements on Internet. In some 
of the countries there is just one legal paper, 
called legal gazette, while in others there are 
generally two types – a legal gazette for the 
national legislation and an official gazette for all 
kinds of approved official information. 
 
 
Country, name, type and 
Internet address of the official 
paper 
Institution 
responsible for 
publishing the 
official paper 
Access on 
Internet 
Texts and 
date (of 
the texts) 
Official 
character? 
Additions on 
Internet 
European Union – “Official 
Journal of the European Union” 
– legal gazette - 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/ 
Office for Official 
Publications of the 
European 
Communities 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1998  
TIFF from 
1952 
 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1e
u.htm 
Belgium – “Belgisch Staatsblad” 
- legal gazette - 
http://www.staatsblad.be/cgi/welc
ome.pl 
 
http://www.moniteur.be/cgi/welco
me.pl 
Belgisch Staatsblad 
- part of the Federal 
Public Service Justice 
Free of 
charge 
ASCII and 
PDF from 
1997 
Yes, just 
five copies 
are 
published on 
paper 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1b
e.htm  
Czech Republik – “Sbírka 
zákonů - Sb.” (Collection of 
Acts) - legal gazette 
Ministerstvo vnitra 
České republiky
Odbor 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
4.4.1945 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
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“Sbírka mezinárodních smluv - 
Sb.m.s.” 
(Collection of International 
Treaties) - legal gazette - 
http://www.mvcr.cz/2003/rady/sbi
rka_rady.html   
komunitárního 
práva – part of 
Ministry of Interior 
 
prod/html/gaz1cz
.htm  
Denmark– “Lovtidende” 
(Official Journal) - legal gazette - 
http://www.retsinfo.dk/lovtid/lovti
d.htm  
Civilstyrelsen 
(Civil Affairs 
Agency) – part of 
Ministry of Justice 
Free of 
charge 
HTML 
from 1995 
After 
adopting an 
amendment 
in law, yes + 
just one 
paper copy 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1d
k.htm  
Germany – “Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl.)” (German Federal Legal 
Gazette) - legal gazette - 
http://www.bundesgesetzblatt.de  
“Bundesanzeiger (BAnz)” 
(Federal Gazette) - official gazette 
Bundesanzeiger 
Verlagsgesellschaft 
mbH 
(Bundesanzeiger 
Publishing House Co. 
Ltd.) – private 
company; The federal 
government through 
federal Ministry of 
Justice holds 35,1 % 
of the shares 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1998 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1d
e.htm  
Estonia – “Riigi Teataja, RT” 
(State Gazette) - legal gazette - 
http://www.riigiteataja.ee  
Riigi Teataja 
Kirjastus (State 
Gazette Publishing 
House) – a state 
owned company 
Free of 
charge 
HTML 
and XML 
from 2002 
Yes, + five 
paper copies 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1ee
.htm  
Greece – “Fill Efimerida Tis 
Kivernisis - F.E.K.” (National 
Gazette Issues) - legal gazette - 
http://www.et.gr  
Ethniko Typografio 
(National Printing 
House of Greece) – 
under Ministry of 
Interior, public 
administration and 
decentralization 
Free of 
charge 
 No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1gr
.htm  
Spain – “Boletín Oficial del 
Estado” (Official State Bulletin) - 
legal gazette - http://www.boe.es  
Boletín Oficial del 
Estado (Official 
State Bulletin) – 
independent 
organization  
Free of 
charge 
XML 
from 1960 
PDF from 
1998 
TIFF from 
1875 
No, but t he 
electronic 
version is 
considered 
authentic 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1es
.htm  
France – “Journal Officiel de la 
République française (JORF)” 
(Official Journal of French 
Republic) - legal gazette - 
http://www.journal-
officiel.gouv.fr  
Direction des 
Journaux officiels 
(Directorate of 
Official Journals) – a 
state office under the 
Secretary-General of 
the Cabinet 
Free of 
charge 
PDF, 
TIFF, 
HTML 
from 1990 
Yes, since 1 
July 2004. 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1fr
.htm  
Ireland – “Acts of the 
Oireachtas and Statutory 
Instruments Iris Oifigiúil” (Irish 
State Gazette) - legal gazette - 
http://www.oireachtas.ie (click on 
'Legislation') 
http://www.irisoifigiuil.ie 
(secondary legislation) 
Office of Public 
Works 
Government 
Supplies Agency – 
part of the Office for 
Public Activities 
Free of 
charge 
PDF No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1ie
.htm  
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Italy – “Gazzetta Ufficiale della 
Repubblica italiana” (Official 
Gazette of the Italian Republic) - 
legal gazette - 
http://www.normeinrete.it  
Ministero della 
Giustizia - Direzione 
della Gazzetta 
Ufficiale della 
Repubblica Italiana 
(Ministry of Justice - 
Directorate of the 
Official Gazette of 
the Italian Republic) 
– part of Ministry of 
Justice  
Free of 
charge 
ASCII and 
PDF from 
1989 
No, but a 
new 
amendment 
will change 
this const 
elation  
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1it.
htm  
Cyprus – “Epissimi Efimerida 
tis Dimokratias tis Kyprou” 
(Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Cyprus) - legal gazette - 
http://www.cygazette.com  
Government 
Printing Office – 
part of Ministry of 
Finance 
Free of 
charge 
From 
2004 
Yes https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1c
y.htm  
Latvia – “Latvijas Vēstnesis” 
(Latvian Herald) - legal gazette - 
http://www.vestnesis.lv  
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
BO VSIA (Latvian 
Herald, Ltd) – a 
company, owned by 
the government 
through, Ministry of 
Justice 
Partially 
free of 
charge, 
partially 
not 
HTML 
from 1996 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1lv
.htm  
Lithuania – “Valstybės Žinios” 
(Official Gazette) - legal gazette - 
http://www.valstybes-zinios.lt   
Valstybės imonė 
Seimo leidykla 
“Valstybės žinios” 
(The Publishing 
House of the 
Parliament of 
Lithuania “Valstybės 
žinios”) – state 
company, owned by 
the Parliament 
Subscripti
on for 
PDF 
PDF + 
Microsoft 
Word 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1lt.
htm  
Luxembourg – “Mémorial A” - 
legal gazette  
“Mémorial B”, “Mémorial C” - 
official gazette - 
http://www.legilux.public.lu/  
Ministère d'Etat - 
Service Central de 
Législation, éditeur 
du Mémorial 
(Ministry of State – 
Central Legislative 
Service, Editor of the 
“Mémorial”) – a 
government agency 
Free of 
charge 
Mémorial 
A, PDF 
from 1935 
Mémorial 
B and 
Mémorial 
C, PDF 
from 1996 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1lu
.htm  
Hungary – “Magyar Közlöny 
MK” (Hungarian Official Journal) 
- legal gazette - 
http://www.magyarkozlony.hu  
Magyar Hivatalos 
Közlönykiadó 
(Hungarian Official 
Journal Publisher) – a 
company, owned by 
the government 
Free of 
charge 
ASCII 
from 1990 
PDF from 
2000  
HTML 
from 1998 
XML 
from 2002 
others 
from 1996 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1h
u.htm  
Malta – “Il-Gazzetta tal-Gvern 
ta' Malta” (The Malta 
Government Gazette) - legal 
gazette - http://www.doi.gov.mt  
Dipartiment ta' l-
Informazzjoni 
(DOI) (Department 
of Information DOI) 
– under the Prime 
Minister 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
June 2003 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1m
t.htm  
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The Netherlands – “Staatsblad” 
(State Journal) - legal gazette 
http://www.overheid.nl/op/index.h
tml  
“Nederlandse Staatscourant” 
(Dutch State Gazette) - official 
gazette - 
http://www.staatscourant.nl  
SDU Uitgevers BV 
(SDU Publishers Ltd) 
– a company, downed 
by the government 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1995  
HTML 
from 1998 
XML 
from 2003 
No, however 
after 
adopting an 
amendment 
in law this 
would be 
possible 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1nl
.htm  
Austria – “Bundesgesetzblatt” 
(Federal Law Journal) - legal 
gazette - http://www.ris.bka.gv.at  
“Amtsblatt zur Wiener Zeitung” 
(Official Gazette of the Vienna 
Newspaper) - official gazette 
Bundeskanzleramt, 
Verfassungsdienst 
(Federal Chancellery, 
Constitutional 
Service) – part of the 
Federal Chancellery  
The official gazette is 
published by the 
Wiener Zeitung 
Free of 
charge 
HTML 
from 1983 
to 2003 
PDF from 
1999  
XML 
from 2004 
Yes, paper 
copies are 
not 
published at 
all 
https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1at
.htm  
Poland – “Dziennik Ustaw 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
(Dz.U.)” (Journal of Laws of the 
Republic of Poland) - legal 
gazette - 
http://www.isip.sejm.gov.pl/prow
o/index.html  
“Dziennik Urzędowy 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
“Monitor Polski” (MP)” 
(Official Journal of the Republic 
of Poland “Monitor Polski”) - 
official gazette  
Rządowe Centrum 
Legislacji - 
Redakcja Dziennika 
Ustaw 
Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej oraz 
Dziennika 
Urzędowego 
Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej „Monitor 
Polski“(Government
al Centre for 
Legislation - 
Editorial office of the 
Journal of Laws of 
the Republic of 
Poland –a state 
agency 
Official Journal of 
the Republic of 
Poland "Monitor 
Polski") 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1995 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1pl
.htm  
Португалия – “Diário da 
República (DR)” (Journal of the 
Republic) - legal gazette - 
http://www.dre.pt  
Imprensa Nacional - 
Casa da Moeda, SA 
(The Portuguese 
Official Printing 
Office and Mint) – a 
company, owned by 
the government 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1960 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1pt
.htm  
Slovenia – “Uradni list 
Republike Slovenije” (The 
Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia) - legal gazette - 
http://www.uradni-list.si  
Javno podjetje 
Uradni list 
Republike Slovenije 
d. o. o. (The Public 
Company Official 
Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia 
d.o.o.) – the major 
owner – the state  
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1995  
HTML 
from 1995 
Yes https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1si
.htm  
Slovak Republic – “Zbierka 
zákonov Slovenskej republiky 
Ministerstvo 
spravodlivosti 
Free of 
charge 
From 
1945 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
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Abbreviation: Z.z.” (Official 
Journal of the Slovak Republic) - 
legal gazette - 
http://www.justice.gov.sk 
http://www.jaspi.justice.gov.sk  
Slovenskej 
republiky (Ministry 
of Justice of the 
Slovak Republic) – 
part of the Ministry 
of Justice 
HTML 
and PDF  
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1sk
.htm  
Finland – “Suomen 
säädöskokoelma / Finlands 
författningssamling” (Statutes of 
Finland) - legal gazette - 
http://www.finlex.fi/lains  
“Virallinen lehti, Virle” (The 
Official Gazette) - official gazette 
Edita Publishing Oy 
(Edita Publishing 
Ltd) – company, 
owned by the 
government 
Free of 
charge 
PDF from 
1995 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1fi.
htm  
Sweden – “Svensk 
författningssamling (SFS)” 
(Swedish Code of Statutes) - legal 
gazette - 
http://www.lagrummet.se  
“Post-och Inrikes Tidningar” 
(Swedish national Official, under 
the responsibility of the Swedish 
Academy) - official gazette  
Granskningsenhete
n, 
Justitiedepartement
et (Division for Legal 
and Linguistic Draft 
Revision, Ministry of 
Justice) – Ministry of 
Justice  
Free of 
charge 
ASCII 
PDF 
HTML 
No https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1se
.htm   
United Kingdom – Acts of 
parliament and statutory 
instruments are published as 
separate titles and are not 
published as part of a legal 
gazette. There are annual bound 
editions of both, the statutory 
Instruments and all the acts of 
parliament produced in a year. 
These are bound and published in 
numerical order 
“The London Gazette, the 
Belfast Gazette and the 
Edinburgh Gazette” - official 
gazettes - 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislatio
n/uk.htm  
Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office  
Free of 
charge 
Acts from 
1988 
Statutory 
instrument
s from 
1987 
Yes https://forum.eur
opa.eu.int/irc/op
oce/ojf/info/data/
prod/html/gaz1u
k.htm  
 
How is it in America? 
There exist a number of different resources for 
the procurement of legal information in the 
United States. Perhaps the most widely referred 
to is the Federal Register, which is available 
through the Government’s GPO Access portal. 
The Federal Register is a legal newspaper 
published by the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) of the United States 
Government. Its purpose is to provide access to 
the official texts of federal laws, Presidential 
documents, administrative regulations/notices, 
and descriptions of Federal organizations, their 
programs, and activities. Established in 1935 by 
the Federal Register Act, it contains most 
routine publications and notices from 
government agencies; classified documents 
notwithstanding. All executive orders and 
administrative regulations must be published in 
the Federal Register if they are to be legally 
binding*. 
As previously mentioned, the Federal Registry is 
available through GPO Access. GPO Access is a 
service provided by the United States 
Government Printing Office that provides free 
electronic access to information produced by the 
Federal Government. The information provided 
on the site is the official published version and 
the information may generally be used without 
restrictions. The service is funded by the Federal 
Depository Library Program and grew out of 
Public Law 103-40, otherwise known as the 
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Government Printing Office Electronic 
Information Enhancement Act of 1993. 
Although there are no direct statistics on users 
who access the Federal Register specifically, 
there are figures on the number of total 
documents received. The monthly number of 
retrievals is evidence alone that the public is 
taking advantage of the free electronic access. 
The statistics available on the GPO Access 
website have tracked the number of retrievals 
from January 1996 to October 2001. Despite the 
fact that the most recent numbers are over 4 
years old, there is a visible and robust trend of 
increasing retrievals. For example, the number 
of total retrievals in January 1996 numbered 
1,956,342. By October of 2001 that number had 
climbed to 36,477,548. The overall numbers 
suggest that retrieval rates increase by an 
average of approximately 304,958 per month. In 
total, the web page has tracked over 1 billion 
retrievals between 1996 and 2001**. If retrievals 
from the Registry constitute only 10% of the 
total (and this is a completely random 
estimation) then we can assume that this equates 
to approximately 100,000,000 retrievals.  
When considering that most retrievals are well 
over 1 page, the costs of materials, printing, and 
labor pale in comparison to the costs of 
developing and maintaining the website.  
Not so eager to talk about the practice in 
Bulgaria right now. Actually that is not in the 
least my fault. 
----------- 
* University of Rhode Island 
** GPO Access 
 
 
Zero Tax on Reinvested Profit – the Example 
of Estonia 
Georgi Angelov 
 
Corporate taxation in Estonia 
The system of taxation of corporate profits, 
introduced in 2000 in Estonia, is unique. Under 
this system the reinvested profit is not taxed, 
only the distributed profit is taxed. Thus, the 
taxation is shifted from the moment when profits 
are earned to the moment when profits are 
distributed to the owners of the capital. This is 
the reason why the Estonian system of corporate 
taxation became well known as “zero corporate 
profit on reinvested profit”. 
Corporate tax is applied to all distributed profit 
irrespective of the way it is distributed, 
including: 
• dividends and other profit distributions 
• gifts, donations and representation 
expenses 
• expenses and payments not related to 
business 
• fringe benefits 
In 2004 the Parliament of Estonia decided to cut 
the tax rate from 26% in 2004 to 24% in 2005, 
23% in 2006 and to reach a 20% tax rate in 
2007. The tax base is the gross distributed profit 
(including the tax), i.e. the tax rate on the net 
distributed profit is 23/77 of the amount. 
Before the introduction of the zero tax on the 
reinvested profit in Estonia, there existed 
depreciation allowances – up to 8% for buildings 
and 40% for equipment. Because there is no 
taxation of the profits since 2000, there is no 
need for depreciation allowances.  
 
Revenues in the government budget 
In the first years after the introduction of zero 
corporate tax on the reinvested profits the 
revenues from this tax in the consolidated 
budget decreased nearly twice. In 1999 the 
revenues were 1638.8 million krooni, in 2000 
and 2001 the revenues are 854.5 and 748.3 
million krooni /see graph 1/. Part of the 
explanation for this fall of the tax revenues is 
connected with a transitory rule, which allows to 
companies that pay dividends to use tax credit 
for the profit tax, paid before 2000. 
However, the drop of tax revenues is short 
lasting – only three years later, in 2004, the tax 
revenues from he corporate tax increased nearly 
four fold and reached 2522 million krooni. 
Despite the zero corporate tax on the reinvested 
profit, the revenues from the corporate tax 
recovered within a few years. 
The same tendency can be seen in the corporate 
tax revenues as percentage of the gross value-
added (GDP) /see graph 2/. In the first two years 
after the introduction of zero corporate tax on 
the reinvested profit the corporate tax revenues 
dropped more than two times, but after that 
rapidly recovered. Moreover, the corporate tax 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
Economic Policy Review, issue 36, February 2006 
14
revenues reached levels higher that the average 
level for the last nine years. 
The introduction of zero corporate tax on the 
reinvested profit had only a temporary negative 
effect on the budget revenues, which after that 
rapidly recovered above the previous levels. The 
explanation for this phenomenon can be based 
on the so-called Laffer curve, which shows how 
the tax cut can lead to higher budget revenues 
because of dynamic effects – more investments, 
production and taxable income. This is exactly 
the conclusion of the Government of Estonia in 
the “National Report on Economic Reform 
2004”: “Estonia’s example is therefore good 
enough to say that lower taxes contribute to 
economic growth while increasing budgetary 
revenues of the state.” 
 
Graph 1: Revenues from corporate tax, mln. krooni 
891.0
1228.4
1914.1
1638.8
854.5 748.3
1348.0
2,156.4
2,522.10
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
re
ve
nu
es
, m
ln
. k
ro
on
i
 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 
 
Graph 2: Revenues from corporate tax, share of GDP 
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Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, author’s calculations 
 
Effect on economy 
 
Academic research. In 2001 the Central bank of 
Finland published a research on the dynamic 
effects of the introduction of a zero tax rate on 
the reinvested profit in Estonia.8 According the 
                                                 
8 Michael Funke, 2001, “Determining the taxation 
and investment impacts of Estonia’s 2000 income tax 
study “The modeling and calibration results 
herein strongly support the view that Estonia’s 
2000 corporate tax reform should encourage 
investment spending”. A subsequent study in 
2005* confirms the positive effects from the 
introduction of zero corporate tax on reinvested 
profit – the 2000 tax law leads to higher 
                                                                         
reform”, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in 
Transition (BOFIT) 
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investment, including foreign investment, in 
short, medium and long term. 
Foreign investment. In 1999 the foreign direct 
investments in Estonia were 284 million euro. In 
the next year, when the zero corporate tax was 
introduced, they reached 424 million euro, and 
in 2004 – 838 million euro. Within five years the 
foreign investment increased three times. 
The biggest increase was recorded by the 
reinvested profit. While in 1999 46 million euro 
were reinvested, in 2004 this amount reached 
573 million euro. It increased 12 times within 
only 5 years. 
The net direct investments, measured as the 
volume of the foreign investments in Estonia 
minus the volume of the Estonian investment 
abroad, also increased considerably. In 1999 
they were 205 million, while in 2004 they 
reached 621 million. The increase is three times 
greater. 
Overall, there is a significant growth of the 
foreign investment in Estonia in the years after 
the introduction of zero corporate tax on 
reinvested profit. 
 
Table 1: Foreign direct investment, mln. euro 
   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Direct investment in Estonia 284.3 424.7 602.7 306.8 822.2 838.0 
    Share capital 163.1 250.9 232.7 52.5 340.6 296.5 
    Reinvested profit 46.1 116.0 247.9 215.4 409.5 573.0 
    Other 75.0 50.9 123.1 67.0 94.2 -40.9 
Direct investment abroad -79.2 -66.7 -225.5 -139.9 -137.4 -216.5
Direct investment (net) 205.0 358.0 377.2 166.9 685.0 621.5 
Source: Central Bank of Estonia 
 
Total investment. Let’s look at development of 
the total investment, measured by the national 
accounts methodology /see graph 3/. The 
investment expenditures are highly variable and 
depending on many factors, including the 
business cycle. In order to circumvent this 
complication, we can examine the trend of the 
investment expenditures – the trend will show 
the direction and magnitude of the change. We 
can see that, after the introduction of the zero 
corporate tax on the reinvested profit, the trend 
of increase of the share of investment in GDP 
is accelerating. 
 
Graph 3: Total investment, 1993 - 2004 
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Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, author’s calculations 
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Economic development. The average economic 
growth between 1993 and 1999 was 3.85%. 
After the introduction of zero corporate tax on 
reinvested profit the economic growth nearly 
doubled and reached 7.22% for the period 2000 
– 2004. Each and every year after 2000 the 
economic growth is above 6%, and most of the 
years it is higher than 7%. This shows a strong 
increase of the rate economic growth in the 
period after the introduction of zero corporate 
tax on reinvested profit. 
Graph 4: Economic growth, 1994 - 2004 
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Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, author’s calculations 
 
Conclusion 
The introduction of zero corporate tax on 
reinvested profit in Estonia in 2000 is an 
undisputable success. After a short drop, the 
revenues in the government budget recovered 
rapidly. The foreign investment increased 
dramatically. The rate of growth of the total 
investment’s share in GDP increased. The 
economic growth almost doubled. 
------------ 
* Michael Funkе, Holger Strulik, 2005, “Taxation, 
Growth And Welfare: Dynamic Effects Of Estonia’s 
2000 Income Tax Act”, Hamburg University mimeo 
 
Landing on Cracked Track 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
State policy on development and management of 
infrastructure lets us think that either it does not 
want to “give up” control due to various reasons 
(lost of influence and the need to reduce 
considerable part of administration, etc.) or it 
does not realize the benefits of transferring 
infrastructure to the private sector. The last is 
well known by the Ministry of Regional Works 
and Development since it has variety of 
information on its website about international 
experience and the positive impact of private 
management of airports. All examples are about 
big airports that have been privatized and the 
outcome benefits are improved infrastructure, 
rising of passengers’ numbers and their 
satisfaction. 
 
Airports and Privatization 
State failure in airport privatization in Bulgaria 
is happening because: 
1) Privatization procedure is highly obstructed 
(i.e. Varna and Bourgas airports case) that leads 
to postponing, problems and vitiation of the 
privatization process in the country. Most of the 
investors that dare to participate and make long 
term plans are not sure about the outcome. 
2) The state protects ‘national interest’ and 
sometimes abuses the term ‘national security’. 
The law on privatization and post privatization 
control contains a special list of enterprises with 
more than 50% of state shares, privatization of 
which should be done after approval of the 
Parliament on suggestion of Council of 
ministers. This list has been corrected several 
times and neither its initial version nor its 
amendments have been grounded. No one really 
knows how the state would react if a serious 
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potential investor is interested in one of the 
listed state companies and wants fast and clear 
privatization procedure. For information we 
would say that there are 114 state companies in 
the list and we assume that all enterprises would 
need privatization strategy that can be either 
burdened or meaningless or its creation would 
last for years. 
The list includes big state companies such as 
airports, harbors, post service, railways, etc. 
Every attempt so far to privatize some of them 
has been accompanied by scandals, languishing 
of investors’ interest, enormous budget subsides, 
delay of development of attached branches, etc. 
In recent years state airports were among the few 
state companies that realized profit and this is 
the best moment to sell them fast by realizing 
big fiscal effects for the state. 
Sofia Airport – This Month Example 
The problems with the collapse of part of the 
newly built roof and cracked landing–strip of 
Sofia airport lead us to the following 
conclusions. 
First, the state as investor is a lost cause. In 
almost all cases when taxpayers’ money are 
spent in the form of subsidies and state-
guaranteed loans, the responsibility is common; 
the interest is not protected as a private investor 
would do; the control is inefficient and as a 
result there are grounds for corruption and 
failure of the project. But most importantly – the 
responsibility is born by the state which means 
by all of us. 
How much does Sofia airport cost up to now? 
 
Stages of Reconstruction, Development and 
Enlargement of Sofia Airport Project Period 
Financing 
(Euro 
Mln.) 
Financing 
organization  Major contractor 
Financial Agreement between EIB and 
Bulgaria for new passenger terminal  
September 
1997 60  
European 
Investment Bank   
Construction of new land-trip system  June  1998 41.5  
Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic 
Development  
Consortium 
Mohamed Al-
Karafi and Sons – 
Admak General 
Contacting 
Company  
Financing of consultancy company for the 
project   
April 
1998  7.6  PHARE  
 
Financing of construction of new passenger 
terminal  
August  
2000  50  ISPA 
Strabag 
International  
Bulgarian co-financing for new passenger 
terminal by state budget 
December  
2000  
Not 
available State budget 
 
Total  159.1    
 
We have not included state administration 
expenditures or lost benefits from prolonging the 
project for more than 9 years. 
Maybe again to protect the national interest 
signed contracts with the supervisory company 
and the contractor are not publicly available. 
Several newspapers released information about 
the lack of a clause for “guarantee for good 
execution” by the supervisor, nor do we know 
whether in the contract for the new terminal 
there is possibility for renegotiating prices in 
case of “rising the price of petrol or steel”.  
Every time when there is a lack of transparency 
and publicity of contracts between state and 
other companies we can expect delays, 
renegotiating and corruption. It is not clear what 
the ministry should do to accelerate completion 
of the project or how it can terminate the 
contract. The ministry claims that it will by all 
means avoid termination of the contract and file 
a court claim because this can prolong the 
project for years. How can we be sure however 
that after new conditions are agreed on there will 
be no other re-designing and spending of 
additional state funds? 
Second, it should be clear that until the project is 
completed the state cannot give Sofia airport on 
concession if it has such intentions. The 
financing agreements do not allow for 
concession until these agreements are in force. 
To summarize we can say that almost all 
decisions in relation to Sofia airport are 
unprofessional and highly politically influenced. 
Lack of political will for starting and 
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completing, as faster as possible Sofia airport 
privatization is the main obstacle and cause for 
the troubles. It appears that the state “is not 
ready” to withdraw from its activities and to let 
private sector do what it best can do – invest, 
develop and maintain an airport that will provide 
all clients with good services at competitive 
prices. 
 
What can be done? 
• Full inspection of all stages so far and 
what is left to be done; 
• Request of additional guarantees from 
the contractor and supervisor of the 
project for completion until September 
2006; 
• Receiving of contract forfeit for delays; 
• If an agreement is not reached an action 
against the contractor should be taken – 
file a lawsuit and after that 
• Renegotiating financial agreements with 
European Commission and EIB that 
would allow for  
• Concession of Sofia airport where the 
concessionary pays the unused financing 
so far and the money already spent by 
current contractor are reimbursed after 
finishing the court trial; 
• Immediate concession of all airports 
using transparent auction.  
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